| Still fighting over Kabul Hindustan Times
09/09/2003
By Ved Pratap Vaidik
[Printer Friendly Version]
The continuing Pakistan-Afghanistan imbroglio is a riddle even for keen watchers of international affairs. The sacking of the Pakistani embassy by Afghans and the hurried retreat of the Pakistani diplomats from Kabul recently has raised eyebrows. Despite the public apology and announcement of compensation by Hamid Karzai, the normalcy between the neighbours is very slow to come by. So how is it that the Afghans and Pakistanis treat each other more curtly than Indians and Pakistanis? There are at least three reasons for the two countries to have shown more camaraderie. First, Afghanistan and Pakistan do not associate themselves with the rival camps anymore. The bitterness witnessed between Sardar Daud and General Ayub during the Cold War years need not reappear at this juncture between Karzai and Pervez Musharraf. Second, Pakistan not only sheltered about 3 million Afghan refugees for almost two decades but actively helped them fight the Soviet forces and the communist regime in Kabul. Third, the geo-political configuration of the area is such that Afghanistan and Pakistan are totally dependent on each other for their vital trade and transit routes between Central Asia and the Indian Ocean. Despite all these compulsions (including the common factor of Islam), there is an anti-Pakistan atmosphere building up in Afghanistan. The reasons could be two-fold. One is immediate and the other is historical. The Taliban, despite their flight from Kabul, are still a thorn on the side of both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Both neighbours are out to please the US. But Washington is sore because the Taliban are still thriving in some parts of Afghanistan. The main culprits, Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar, are still at large. Both neighbours are blaming each other for this serious lapse. The Afghans think that the Taliban and al-Qaeda elements are hiding in the border areas of Pakistan. Moreover, Musharraf does not mince words in running down the Karzai government. While in Europe, he stated that Karzai’s writ does not run beyond Kabul, Musharraf squarely blames the Afghan government for derecognising the age-old Durand Line by crossing it on the pretext of chasing the Taliban. Before Karzai could react to these baseless charges, ordinary Afghans reacted swiftly by attacking the Pakistani embassy. Pakistan holds two factors responsible for this anti-Pakistan wave in Afghanistan. One is the group of influential ministers belonging to the Northern Alliance and the other is India. Defence Minister Mohammad Qasim Fahim and Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah, who worked very closely with President Burhanuddin Rabbani during the pre-Taliban years, are allegedly the main pillars of the anti-Pakistan policy. It is a fact that non-Pathans are in the majority in the Karzai cabinet and the party headed by Rabbani is not favourably disposed towards Pakistan. How could they be, considering that it was Pakistan that supported and recognised the Taliban which dislodged the Rabbani regime from Kabul? Pakistan’s allegation against these leaders is that they are out to establish the hegemony of Persian-speaking non-Pathans (Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras) over the Pashtu-speaking Pathans in Afghanistan. They are keen to draw a wedge between Musharraf and Karzai, who is a Pathan himself. Pakistan is also incensed about the possibility of a radical change in the character of the New Afghan Army, which is predominantly manned by the Pathans. The Pakistani strategy of using the Pathans could really turn out to be a double-edged sword. History tells us that whenever strong Pathan leaders ascended in Kabul, they raised the banner of independent Pakhtunistan or Greater Afghanistan. Unbridled Pathan ascendancy in Kabul is a sure recipe for the division of Pakistan. Despite this in-built danger, the Pakistani elite is harping on the same old tune. It has not been able to stir out of the stupor of Talibani opium as yet. It does not want to abandon its hobby-horse and appreciate the radical change which has crept into the Afghan political anatomy during the last three disturbed decades. The Pakistani establishment is at a loss to explain the massacre at the Shia Mosque built by the Afghan Hazaras in Quetta about a century ago. The incident gave a blow to the image of Pakistan among its western sympathisers. The Hazaras are also Persian-speaking. It would be ridiculous to blame the so-called Northern Alliance for this heinous act. Who except the remnants of the Taliban and al-Qaeda could be responsible for this massacre? Pakistan is unable to pin down the real culprits because it is in league with them clandestinely. The root cause of the Pak-Afghan conflict lies buried in history. The successive governments of Afghanistan since 1893 have remained ambivalent or clearly against the Durand Line, which divided the Pathan tribes of the subcontinent. After the creation of Pakistan, both countries nearly went to war on the question of the line at least thrice. Afghanistan was the only country to oppose the entry of Pakistan in the United Nations. Even the Mujahideen and Taliban governments, which came to power through active Pakistani support, never clearly recognised the Durand Line. The Afghan irredentism on the question of Pakhtunistan goes as far back as 250 years ago. The rulers at Kandahar and Kabul have always been eyeing Peshawar as part of their kingdom. The sense of gratitude towards Pakistan for extending refuge and providing military assistance to the Afghans is also fast evaporating in the light of new facts emerging from American sources. The Afghans feel that Pakistan made more money and cornered more conventional arms during the Afghan resistance than during the Cold War — as it is doing today in the name of fighting terrorism. Pakistan owes a lot to Afghanistan. It has no business to browbeat Kabul. The writer is former Editor, Nav Bharat Times
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