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 An Ariana Media Publication 02/09/2010
 Tension Rises Between Two Key Afghans: Defense Chief Is Seen As Threat to Karzai And Nation's Stability

The Washinton Post
08/05/2002
By Susan B. Glasser and Pamela Constable


KABUL, Afghanistan - A smoldering power struggle between Hamid Karzai, Afghanistan's U.S.-backed president, and Mohammed Fahim, the ambitious defense minister who commands thousands of loyal troops, has flared into serious confrontation in recent weeks, raising concerns here and abroad of a violent split in the still-fragile government.

During six months as the country's appointed leader, Karzai largely avoided antagonizing Fahim, an ethnic and political rival, accommodating his demands and allowing him unfettered rule over a military mini-empire dominated by fellow ethnic Tajik militia fighters from northeastern Afghanistan's Panjshir Valley.
But since being elected president in June, Karzai has taken several unexpected steps to challenge Fahim, which officials said have alarmed and infuriated the defense chief. Two weeks ago, Karzai ordered Fahim to drastically reduce the number of Panjshiris in the Defense Ministry and replace them with non-Tajiks, according to foreign diplomats and Afghan officials.

More tellingly, Karzai dismissed his Defense Ministry guards and replaced them with U.S. Special Forces after the assassination of Vice President Abdul Qadir in July, suggesting that Karzai doubted Fahim's loyalty.

Karzai was not available to be interviewed for this article, but some officials close to him say they fear the growing tension could lead to violent reprisals against the president, whose political base remains weak and whose authority barely extends beyond Kabul.
The growing confrontation between Afghanistan's top civilian and military officials raises the alarming prospect of a return to the kind of violent political feuding that destroyed the country in the early 1990s. If Afghanistan relapsed into civil strife, it would seriously jeopardize the flow of foreign aid and investment the country desperately needs to rebuild its economy and pacify the gun-riddled countryside.

"For six months Fahim dictated to Karzai, and he was the most powerful man in Afghanistan. Now he is worried that may change," said a deputy minister who is close to Karzai. "The president has gotten [foreign] protection now, but I still think he is in danger. Fahim and his friends are warlords, and you cannot make peaceful men out of them. If the situation remains as it is, I think we are headed back to civil war."
Fahim's power stems from his position as military leader of the Panjshir-based Northern Alliance militia, a post he inherited last September when Ahmed Shah Massoud, the alliance's charismatic chief and a hero of the armed resistance to Soviet occupation in the 1980s, was assassinated. In the months that followed, the alliance played a key role in the U.S.-led war to topple the Taliban, acting as the Americans' ground force in northern Afghanistan and capturing Kabul on Nov. 13.

Fahim and other Panjshiri leaders believe their role in defeating the Taliban, after five years of armed resistance to extremist Islamic rule, has earned them the right to control Afghanistan's defense establishment. Panjshiris dominate the Defense, Interior and Foreign ministries, as well as the intelligence police.

"This is an achievement. Karzai does not have the right to take it back," said Attah Mohammad, a top commander in the Northern Alliance and a Fahim loyalist.

Karzai, a tribal elder from the dominant Pashtun ethnic group, was the main U.S. ally against the Taliban in southern Afghanistan. He rallied southern tribal militias against them with American money and covert support, and he was rewarded by being installed as chairman of an interim coalition government formed under U.N. direction in December.

But although Karzai enjoys strong diplomatic and political backing from Washington, the U.S. military preoccupation with rooting out Islamic terrorism has required U.S. forces to continue relying on Fahim's help. This has shored up his power and in the process undermined Karzai, who has no militia of his own and depends on a multinational peacekeeping force to keep order in the capital.

In the past month, U.S. officials have begun to reassess their relationship with the Northern Alliance, pressing for Defense Ministry reforms and for better Afghan military cooperation in the U.S. program to train a multi-ethnic national army, which Afghan and American officials view as the only solid antidote to the pernicious influence of regional, ethnic-based militias. But domestic and foreign critics say Washington should be pressing much harder.

"The U.S. government is making a terrible mistake in supporting Fahim," said one Western official with long experience in Afghanistan. "The U.S. has the resources to understand this man is not a reliable partner [and that] he could be easily replaced," the official said. "Fahim's basic tendencies are those of a street thug."

Fahim's office said he was not available for an interview. But his supporters dismiss accusations that he seeks to monopolize power or undermine Karzai's authority. They point out that the defense minister has repeatedly voiced support for Karzai and for the creation of a new national army that transcends political and ethnic loyalties.

Fahim has also demonstrated shrewd public relations sense, switching from combat fatigues to business suits and recently forming a National Defense Council that includes former warlords as well as ex-army officials. At its first meeting, Fahim called for all militia factions, including his own, to permanently disarm.

One Foreign Ministry official said Fahim is committed to Afghanistan's national interests but feels he deserves a large share of the political booty. The official said Fahim is defensive about criticism of fellow mujaheddin who fought the jihad, or holy war, against Soviet occupation -- whether or not they are qualified for government posts.

"Fahim has a certain style and mentality, but he's not stupid enough to think he can be head honcho. What he really wants is respect," said the official. "For him the jihad is a sacred part of Afghan history, and no one may insult it. He can be a team player if he is given the right amount of attention and respect. The question is how much."
Toward a Broader Vision

Despite his recent moves to challenge Fahim's power, Karzai has continued trying to placate him on the sensitive issues of job titles and patronage, officials said, partly because he remains wary of the militia leader and partly because he hopes to deepen Fahim's stake in a strong central government with a broad national vision.

In June, after Karzai was elected transitional president, he faced strong public pressure to revamp the cabinet, in which three of the most powerful positions were held by Panjshiris: Fahim, Interior Minister Yonus Qanooni and Foreign Minister Abdullah.
Qanooni agreed to step down, but the president felt he had no choice but to keep Fahim at defense, officials said. Karzai also named him as one of three vice presidents, but then tried to persuade him to give up one post or the other, arguing that no official should hold two portfolios.
Fahim insisted that he should keep both, warning Karzai to "be careful with me," according to one participant in the meeting. After more arguing, the exasperated Karzai turned to Qadir, an ethnic Pashtun who had been given one of the other vice presidential spots, and said that if Fahim was to be both defense minister and vice president, then Qadir should be both public works minister and vice president.
"Fahim got very angry and didn't speak," the official said. That night six rockets were fired close to Karzai's palace, and the official said he believed they were a warning from the military. "They wanted to show Karzai: If you insist, we can hurt you," the official said.
At the Interior Ministry, Karzai replaced Qanooni with a Pashtun minister, Taj Mohammed Wardak, but the agency remained dominated by Panjshiri officials. Late last month, Northern Alliance leaders demanded that a Pashtun deputy minister be fired and replaced with a Fahim loyalist. Wardak strongly objected but Karzai overruled him, according to several witnesses, ordering him to keep the current deputy but to take on Fahim's man as well.

"Karzai is trying to keep the balance," said one government official who saw the confrontation. "He doesn't want to fight" with the Panjshiris. Other diplomats said Karzai remains eager to avoid a break with the Northern Alliance and believes he is making progress in broadening Fahim's vision of himself as more than the head of an ethnic faction.
"He's been saying to him, 'If you want to be the head of the Panjshiris, then I'll appoint you district commissioner of Panjshir. You have to be a . . . national leader,' " the diplomat said.

The unsolved assassination of Qadir, who was gunned down outside his office by unknown assailants on July 6, has added enormously to tensions within the government and to the longtime friction between Karzai and Fahim.
Qadir, an ethnic Pashtun and former Soviet resistance fighter, had good relations with the Northern Alliance, but a number of officials, including his older brother Din Mohammed, who replaced Qadir as governor of Nangahar province, said they believe he was killed because of his fast rise in the new administration.

Many Pashtuns and some senior government officials believe the Northern Alliance was linked to the slaying, and when Karzai quickly turned to the U.S. military to replace his Afghan bodyguards, the move deepened public suspicion that Fahim loyalists may have been involved in Qadir's assassination.


Twice Humiliated

For Fahim, Karzai's decision to shift to American guards and his proposal to seek international help with investigating Qadir's slaying were humiliating blows. Witnesses in cabinet meetings said the moves aroused agitated debate, with Fahim condemning them as "shameful" to the government.

Attah Mohammad, the northern militia commander closely allied with Fahim, called Karzai's switch of palace guards "not only an insult to Fahim [but] an insult to the whole nation." He said Fahim agreed to the shift only after Abdullah and Qanooni argued that it was acceptable.
The demand by Karzai to replace Panjshiris in the Defense Ministry with non-Tajiks came after a hurried visit here two weeks ago by Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz, who reportedly expressed strong concerns about Defense Ministry foot-dragging and ethnic manipulation in the recruiting and training of the nascent national army.


Two weeks ago, Karzai met with Fahim and demanded that he reduce by 60 percent the number of Defense Ministry officials drawn from his corps of rough Panjshiri fighters and replace them with professionals from other ethnic groups, according to an account of the meeting Karzai gave two Western diplomats. Karzai, though weakened by a lack of armed loyalists in a nation of militias, reportedly reminded Fahim that he, Karzai, was commander in chief. Karzai has also made a point with Fahim and his men of referring to himself as the commander in chief of the armed forces, and he has set up a U.S.-style National Security Council to coordinate policy with staff not dependent on Fahim.
"There is clearly a change in strategy and tactics. Karzai is feeling now is the time to be a national government," said one Western diplomat who often meets with Karzai.


Fahim initially bristled at what he saw as "insults to the mujaheddin," one official recounted, but he later decided it would be prudent to meet at least some of Karzai's demands. "It is now in our interest to give up some positions, because everybody is propagandizing that Panjshiris have too much," he said.

A third source, however, said Fahim's pledge of cooperation came with a characteristic quid pro quo that Karzai was unable or unwilling to oppose: Fahim agreed to switch several Panjshiri officials but insisted that a number of other, far more important ones were "irreplaceable." Those officials, the source said, have kept their jobs.

To a large extent, reports by foreign media and human rights groups on Afghan government infighting have focused on the ethnic rivalry between Pashtuns and Tajiks. Some critics, including non-Panjshiri officials in several ministries, said they are convinced Fahim and his cohort want to systematically reduce the power of Pashtuns, using whatever means they find necessary, and ultimately split the country along ethnic lines.
The Karzai administration has been increasingly upset by such reports, and last week officials issued a formal statement on Kabul television complaining that the foreign press was "distorting" the situation in Afghanistan and publishing "biased" and "inflammatory" reports about ethnic conflicts within the government.


Some officials and observers here said that the problem of ethnic divisions may turn out to be overstated and that the personal ambitions of certain militia leaders, including Fahim, are a far greater threat to stability and progress in a war-weary country where most inhabitants would welcome a return to peaceful coexistence among all groups.


"With Fahim, this is all about ego and passion for power," said a senior government official who is Pashtun. But he and several other officials close to Karzai said they believe Fahim's bullying is largely a bluff, and that the president is being too accommodating to Panjshiri demands. If he were to behave more firmly, they said, Fahim would back off, knowing that Karzai enjoys broad domestic and international support.
"Karzai is talking tougher now, but he is still not consistent," said the first official. "These warlords should and could have been stopped long ago. They are paper tigers, and eventually there will be no place for their plots and machinations in Afghanistan. But if we don't take the bull by the horns, nothing will change."



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