| | The danger of defeatism in Afghanistan The Telegraph, UK
09/09/2010
By Con Coughlin
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Enthusiasm for the conflict is waning, but an early withdrawal will benefit only al-Qaeda
One by one, the pillars that have underpinned our effort to win the war in Afghanistan are being demolished. The process began earlier this summer with the unceremonious removal of General Stanley McChrystal, the US commander of the Nato mission and the architect of the comprehensive counter-insurgency strategy that has been devised to defeat the Taliban. The general's dismissal, which President Obama demanded after the issuing of unflattering comments about his administration to a reporter from Rolling Stone, was accompanied by the formation of a new British Government that is decidedly lukewarm about the Afghan war.
David Cameron might have made all the right noises on his first official visit to Helmand, soon after taking office, promising the troops that they could count on his full backing. But the views that he expresses in private tell a very different story. He regards our involvement in the war as a complete mess, and our prospects of success as remote.
His pessimism, moreover, is shared by most of his senior ministers, including William Hague and Liam Fox, whose main priority appears to be how quickly we can withdraw our troops, rather than how best they can succeed.
Nick Clegg, who enjoyed a photo-opportunity of his own in Helmand last week, makes no secret of his opposition to the entire mission. The Deputy Prime Minister may have been impressed by the "bravery and professionalism" of the British troops he met during his walkabout. But he leads a party whose conference passed a resolution calling for Nato to pursue a ceasefire, and made withdrawal of combat troops its top priority. Hardly a recipe for success – but then, the Liberal Democrats are not exactly renowned for their martial tradition.
Even the redoubtable Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles, Britain's special envoy to Afghanistan, appears to have had enough. Sir Sherard has spent most of the past four years arguing for a coherent military and political strategy for defeating the Taliban but has now quit his post, no doubt hoping that his efforts will be rewarded with a plum overseas assignment. Suddenly, the bold new strategy for Afghanistan announced by Mr Obama at the end of last year has disintegrated into an exercise in damage limitation.
By way of confirming the new mood of defeatism that has overtaken our governing classes, one of our most prestigious military think tanks is recommending that we completely abandon our current approach and start all over again. The London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) can normally be relied upon to produce reliable and sober assessments of potential global threats and how to deal with them. It broadly supported the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and, until now, has adopted a similar position on Afghanistan. Senior British and American commanders are regularly invited by the institute to give talks on the latest strategic and tactical developments, and are assured of a warm reception.
But in its latest report, the IISS has succumbed to the defeatist mood. It derides Nato's counter-insurgency strategy, which has seen Washington deploy an extra 30,000 troops this summer in support of the military "surge", as outdated, and accuses the campaign of being a victim of not just mission creep but "mission multiplication".
It concludes that the British Government should withdraw its troops from Afghanistan and devise a new strategy that is focused entirely on tackling the terrorist threat posed by al-Qaeda and its allies, rather than trying to persist with the infinitely more challenging task of turning Afghanistan into something approaching a functioning state.
The IISS report, the first by a major British think tank to call time on our military involvement in Afghanistan, will no doubt be music to the ears of many in Whitehall. At a time when President Karzai's government seems more interested in lining its pockets than supporting the arduous efforts at nation-building, it is easy to understand the political appeal of a speedy withdrawal. No more costly overseas military commitment; no more funeral cortèges proceeding through Wootton Bassett.
But rather than resolving one of the greatest challenges that the Coalition faces, such action would be self-defeating – not to mention actively dangerous. The IISS takes issue with Nato's claim that it needs to secure southern Afghanistan to prevent the return of al-Qaeda, and the establishment of the terrorist infrastructure that resulted in the September 11 attacks. The Taliban and al-Qaeda have different agendas, it points out, and al-Qaeda is now based in Pakistan as well as Afghanistan.
But what the IISS and the other naysayers forget is that the only reason al-Qaeda is in Pakistan is because of our military success in southern Afghanistan. If we pull out before the reconstruction effort is completed, then al-Qaeda will simply move back across the border and re-establish itself in Afghanistan. We will be back where we started nine years ago – and all the sacrifices of the past decade will count for nothing.
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