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03/11/2010
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Guest columnist Ahmed Rashid asks what impact the Nato-led assault in Afghanistan's Helmand province and recent arrests of Taliban leaders in Pakistan could have on the volatile region.
The continuing Marjah offensive is an important test both for Western and Afghan military forces.
But it will also test the Afghan government's ability to deliver speedy governance and provide services to people in areas dominated by the Taliban for years.
The make-up of "the government in a box" promoted by US commanders is precisely what was missing when the first Provincial Reconstruction Teams were set up outside Kabul in 2002.
There was no countervailing Afghan authority to provide services to the people after Western forces were deployed.
That failure is only now being addressed.
But the military situation will remain fraught for some time. The staggered Taliban resistance, their use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and mine warfare will ensure the area remains unsafe for months. And small Taliban groups will return to ambush military convoys as they bring supplies to Marjah.
Despite the promise of continued deployment of US and Nato forces, many population centres and agricultural regions have to be cleared and held in the months ahead if the Taliban are to be decisively rolled back - particularly around Kandahar and Kabul.
Manpower still appears limited and careful decisions will have to be made as to what areas are important because not every area will be possible to clear.
There is still a strong belief in Washington that before any dialogue between Kabul and the Taliban can take place, Western forces have to diminish the militants' capabilities.
Hardening stance
But a series of reported arrests of senior Afghan Taliban leaders in Pakistan has opened another intriguing front.
The US is yet to be convinced that the arrests signal a major U-turn by the Pakistani military, which has been accused of harbouring militants since 2002.
On the face of it, for Pakistan to abandon them just as a major offensive unfolds against the Taliban in Afghanistan would be enormously beneficial.
However, instead there is growing concern that the Pakistan military and its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is hardening its terms for a major say in a new round of the Afghan political merry-go-round, as power-brokers prepare for an end to the conflict in the next 18-24 months.
Senior US officials say the arrest of the powerful second-in-command Taliban leader, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, in Karachi in early February was accidental, after the CIA pinpointed the location of a meeting of Taliban commanders where Baradar was found.
The Pakistan military has admitted to holding only Baradar, although between five and eight other Taliban leaders have also been arrested.
Once the arrest was leaked several days after it took place, the Afghan government asked for Baradar and four other Taliban to be extradited to Kabul for questioning.
However, the Lahore high court restrained the government from handing them over to Kabul after a petition was filed by a retired ISI officer, Khalid Khawaja.
Despite repeated requests, US officials have been given only limited access to question Baradar and even less access to others under arrest.
In itself, the arrests have dealt a serious blow to the Taliban's long-term ability to counter the US-Nato offensive in southern Afghanistan.
Baradar was the key logistician and overall political chief for Taliban commanders inside Afghanistan.
Saudi negotiations
But despite his sanctuary, Baradar was at odds with the ISI over the issue of opening a dialogue with Kabul.
Baradar was known to have been in touch with representatives of the Kabul regime, including the brothers of President Hamid Karzai. Both Mr Karzai and Baradar hail from the Popalzai tribe of the Durrani Pashtuns in Kandahar.
Kabul and the Taliban had enlisted the help of Saudi Arabia in this - but the ISI was not involved.
Over the past 12 months Saudi Arabia has been intermittently involved in helping the two sides hold informal talks that so far have not led to more serious negotiations, although they have the potential to do so.
Senior Pakistani military officials subsequently claimed that Baradar was already on the CIA payroll, having been paid $5m by the Americans to begin talks with Mr Karzai. US officials deny any such payments were ever made.
Moreover, the Obama administration is still far from accepting the idea of negotiating with the Taliban leadership.
The US and Nato have agreed to fund the reintegration of Taliban fighters who want to give up arms, a key element of their current offensive - but not reconciliation.
Senior US officials were annoyed at Mr Karzai in the aftermath of the recent London conference when he went beyond reintegration to offer the Taliban leaders - including Mullah Omar - talks and reconciliation.
The Obama administration is divided over the issue of talking to Taliban leaders.
Politicians and civilian officials insist the Taliban have to be significantly diminished through military offensives over the coming year before any such talks between Kabul and Taliban leaders can be encouraged.
The US Defense Department is more sanguine, believing that talks could be held at the same time as the US military neutralises the Taliban.
All US officials agree that the Taliban has to first make a decisive break from their operational alliance with al-Qaeda.
Pakistani stance
Pakistan's fear of being superseded in any future negotiations stems from the belief that it has more at stake in a stable Afghanistan than any other neighbouring country.
Pakistan's most strident demand is that India's role in Afghanistan be drastically reduced. And it wants a say in how power will be shared in Kabul and the critical Pashtun belt in southern and eastern Afghanistan.
There are twice as many Pashtuns living in Pakistan than in Afghanistan, and Pakistan is for the first time waging a successful war against its own Pashtun Taliban.
However, too overt a Pakistani role is likely to be rejected by Mr Karzai, Afghanistan's non-Pashtuns and civil society groups (currently opposed to talks with the Taliban), and even by many Taliban tired of fighting and who would like to end dependence on Pakistan.
Although Pakistan has legitimate security interests in Afghanistan, so do other immediate neighbours like Iran, the Central Asian states and near neighbours like India, China and the Arab Gulf states.
All of them would likely start interfering in Afghanistan if they see growing Pakistani influence.
As President Obama's deadline of July 2011 - to give more responsibility to the Afghan government to start a US withdrawal from Afghanistan - approaches, the war and peace making in Afghanistan is likely to get more complicated.
Ahmed Rashid is the author of the best-selling book Taliban and, most recently, of Descent into Chaos: How the war against Islamic extremism is being lost in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia.
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