The seizure of 215kg of heroin on the Afghan-Tajik border in early July may be heralded as a triumph of authorities, but does little to suggest that the Afghan drugs trade is under threat. This record seizure highlights that the trade has successfully recovered from the 2000 opium ban announced and enforced by the Taliban. The Afghan drug trade has not been deterred by the war on terrorism or American military presence.  Obsessions with the role of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in the drugs trade have contributed to the resurgence of the drugs trade, as this failure to understand the dynamics of the trade allows the major players responsible for producing and trafficking opiates to operate with few obstacles.

BACKGROUND:

 The trade in illicit opiates, as it has emerged and prospered in Central Asia over the past decade, is inherently complex. Five groups of actors take part in its various stages. Only some of these control the trade, whereas the others have taken advantage of it and the instability it creates.
Drug mafias operated in Afghanistan well before the Taliban consolidated power in 1996. Identified by their domestic base and membership normally restricted to specific clans or ethnic groups, they constitute the first line of buyers in the international opiate trade. They act as middlemen between farmers and buyers, and provide poppy seeds and loans to Afghan farmers. Drug mafias have considerable influence in Afghanistan and strong relations with warlords.
Transnational criminal groups have gained control over most trafficking routes bringing Afghan opiates to world markets. These groups have ties throughout Central Asia, including relations with high-level government and law enforcement officers especially along the trafficking routes. Their power also extends to Russia, the Caucasus, Baltic states, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, China, Korea, and western Europe.

Warlords have held an influence over the trade that has diminished slightly of late. Prior to the Taliban, some warlords depended drugs as source of income and weapons, taxing farmers and traffickers, a practice continued by the Taliban. Some warlords established control over production facilities and trafficking routes, and some are active in the trade despite recent developments.

Insurgents and terrorists are the final two groups. Apart for the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan pre-9/11, these groups did not yield considerable regional control over the drugs trade. Groups such as the Taliban and Al Qaeda became involved because the trade already existed. Al Qaeda involvement was extremely limited to 'rogue traders' - members who appeared to take advantage of the Al Qaeda network to secure additional, mainly personal, funding. The Taliban, on the other hand, primarily profited by collecting taxes - and not via large-scale, organized operations.
It is equally important to note that members of the Northern Alliance appeared to have established direct control over aspects of the trade in their areas of operation. Prior to losing territory to the Taliban, the Northern Alliance were linked to opiate production. By 2001, the NA was well positioned to capitalize on the Taliban ban. They raised the are under opium cultivation in Badakhshan province from 2458 ha in 2000 to 6342 ha in 2001; this has been raised further this year to an estimated 8,400 ha.

IMPLICATIONS:

Considering the failure of the western coalition to directly target the drug trade as part of the 'war on terrorism' and reconstruction efforts, it is not surprising that criminal networks are preparing to secure production and trafficking operations - while poppy cultivated this year will produce between 1900 and 2700 tons of opium.

Given the composition of the Afghan drug trade, it is evident that the new Afghan government is both too weak and too compromised to have a significant impact on the drug trade. For one, Karzai needs to find a way to assert political control over drug lords. As it currently stands, Karzai has appeared to respond to this challenge by incorporating 'former' drug lords into the government by offering government positions. As experience in other drug-producing countries dictate, such appointments do little to reverse their criminal involvement. Thus as in Colombia and Myanmar, drug mafias in Afghanistan have the opportunity to seize political power, in addition to the economic power secured from illicit opiates. This predicament is equally true for warlords who have been brought into the government, but who yield equal interests in the drug trade. This does not even consider warlords who continue to operate in regions where the Karzai administration has no control or authority.

The other problem that the current Afghan administration faces is equally daunting and complicated to address. Despite having leveraged their way back to Kabul by cooperating with the international coalition, the Northern Alliance strongholds increased poppy cultivation. Although NA members are associated with raising opium production, they hold powerful positions within the Afghan government. Members of the NA, most ironically, have been appointed to the Ministry of Interior - tasked with counter-narcotics initiatives. Furthermore, high level officials in Kandahar and Helmand, and Ministry of Defense officials are also allegedly tied to the illicit drugs trade. A situation further exacerbated by several allegations that soldiers from the interim government forces have already been found guarding drug markets.

CONCLUSIONS:

Given this reality, it may be safely concluded that counter-narcotics initiatives in Afghanistan are inherently compromised given the blurring between political and criminal allegiances. Even in the event that the Afghan government gain certain counter-narcotics successes, such as seizing drugs shipments, it is difficult not to conclude that sporadic successes will be staged to please the western coalition. Although this may be a very pessimistic assessment, there is little evidence that could be presented to prove the contrary. Even the murder of Vice President Haji Abdul Qadir on July 6 should be understood in the context of overlapping political and criminal allegiances. Linked to the heroin trade himself, yet implicitly tasked with weaning Afghanistan from its dependence on opiates, reveals a contradiction that will continue to threaten and undermine Afghanistan's attempts to reconstruct its future.

AUTHOR BIO: Tamara Makarenko is a lecturer in Criminology at Glamorgan University, a consulting editor of Jane's Intelligence Review, and a Senior Associate of Cornell Caspian Consulting. She is an expert on transnational crime issues in Central Asia and the CIS as a whole.